Flinders v. Roper : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
Flinders v. Roper : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James T. Flinders; Pro Se.
Stephen G Homer; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. J&JF^'l'Ctfl
 IN T H E U T A H COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 87-0091CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A TRIAL AND JUDGMENT ENTERED 
BY THE SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
The Honorable Gregory Skordas, Judge Pro Tempore 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 493 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
JAMES T. FLINDERS 
Pro Se 
1002 Serpentine Way 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 87-0091CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A TRIAL AND JUDGMENT ENTERED 
BY THE SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
The Honorable Gregory Skordas, Judge Pro Tempore 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 493 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
JAMES T. FLINDERS 
Pro Se 
1002 Serpentine Way 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents i 
Table of Authorities Cited i 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 1 
Issues Presented for Appeal 1 
Determinative Statutes 2 
Statement of the Case 3 
Summary of Arguments 4 
Argument 5 
Conclusion 15 
Certificate of Mailing 16 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED 
Statutes 
Section 70A-2-316 (3) (a) , Utah Code 2, 3, 8 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(c), Utah Code 1 
Section 78-2-10(2), Utah Code 1 
Section 78-608, Utah Code 14 
Section 78-27-37, Utah Code 15 
Section 78-27-39, Utah Code 15 
Cases 
Billings Yamaha vs Rick Warner Ford, Inc., 
681 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984) 7 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. vs Armco Steel Company, 
601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) 12 
W. R. H., Inc. vs Econony Lumber Supply, 
633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981) 10 
Court Rules 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 14 
i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal is granted to 
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(c), Utah 
Code, and pursuant to Section 78-6-10(2), Utah Code. 
This case involves the appeal from a trial and judgment 
entered by the Small Claims Department of the Fifth Circuit 
Court, Sandy Department, entered in a civil case wherein the 
plaintiff claimed to be entitled to money damages by reason of 
the Defendant's alleged "negligent inspection" of a motor vehicle 
later purchased by the plaintiff from a third-party. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Whether a purchaser of a motor vehicle in an "as is" 
condition may have recourse against the person who performs a 
"safety inspection" upon the vehicle for mechanical defects in 
the vehicle, when there was no "privity" of contract between the 
purchaser and inspector and when the purchaser's claimed loss is 
not related to "safety" issues (such as would be the case if he 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 870091CA 
1 
or a third-party had been injured by reason of a defective part 
purportedly the subject of the "safety" inspection) , but rather 
are for "fitness" of the purchased motor vehicle. 
2. Whether the Plaintiff's own negligence in continuing to 
drive to Montana with the "stuck" parking brake 
precludes totally or partially his recovery under the 
provisions of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act. 
3. Whether the Plaintiff can recover for mechanical defects in 
the steering when there was no direct evidence that the inspector 
had negligently failed to inspect the same and when Plaintiff's 
sole evidence came from the interested, hearsay statement of a 
mechanic in Montana who indicated the alignment needed repair. 
4. Whether the Plaintiff's failure to join the merchant who 
sold him the allegedly defective motor vehicle precludes 
recovery, 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 70A-2-316, Utah Code, pertaining to the exclusion or 
modification of warranties of goods purchased pursuant to the 
Uniform Commercial Code, is determinative. That statute provides 
in part: 
. . . 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all 
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as 
is", "with all faults" or other language which in 
common understanding calls the buyerfs attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and makes plain there is no 
implied warranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract 
has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully 
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there 
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is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an 
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed 
to him; . . 
Emphasis added. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a civil case, in which the Plaintiff-Respondent 
[hereinafter referrred to as "Buyer"] seeks monetary damages 
against the Defendant-Appellant [hereinafter referred to as 
"Inspector"] for mechanical defects in a used vehicle, purchased 
in an "AS IS" condition from a third-party [hereinafter referred 
to as "Seller"]. This case was heard by the Small Claims 
Department of the Fifth Circuit Court, Sandy Department, Gregory 
Skordas, Judge Pro Tempore. From a judgment in the amount of 
$479.97 entered in favor of the Buyer, the Inspector appeals. 
In November 1986 the Buyer purchased a used motor vehicle, 
in an "AS IS" condition, from a third-party not named as a 
co-defendant in this litigation. Prior to that sale, the 
Inspector acting at the request of the vehicle seller and 
without any contact or contract with the buyer, the 
Buyer---performed the "safety inspection" upon the vehicle and 
issued the Utah Highway Patrol window sticker for the vehicle. 
The Plaintiff took possession of the vehicle and drove the 
vehicle. Shortly thereafter, on a trip to Montana, the oil 
pressure light on the vehicle came "on" and the Buyer pulled off 
the road near McCammon, Idaho. When that difficulty was 
corrected, the Buyer started to move the vehicle, but the 
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"parking" brake was holding the vehicle. The Buyer thought he had 
worked "free" the stuck parking brake and continued his journey 
to Montana. 
Upon arriving in Montana, the Buyer felt that the 
"alignment" was defective and in need of repair. He took the 
vehicle to a mechanic in Montana, who advised him to have the 
alignment repaired at a cost of $191.00. 
Upon returning to Utah, the Buyer inspected the brakes and 
found they allegedly needed repair: the emergency brake cable was 
stuck and the rear brake shoes were severely "burned". He made 
those repairs (or obtained estimates therefor) and filed this 
action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The purchaser of a used motor vehicle, sold in an "AS IS" 
condition, has no recourse against the person who performed a 
"safety inspection" on the vehicle at the request of the seller 
prior to the sale. 
2. The negligence of the purchaser in continuing to drive the 
vehicle after the brakes had stuck precludes his recovery. 
3. The trial court improperly considered incompetent, hearsay 
testimony as evidence of the Inspector's alleged breach of his 
duty of care. 
4. The failure to join the seller of the allegedly-defective 




THE PURCHASE OF THE VEHICLE IN AN "AS IS" CONDITION PRECLUDES 
RECOURSE AGAINST THE PERSON WHO PERFORMED A "SAFETY INSPECTION" 
ON THE VEHICLE WHEN THERE WAS NO "PRIVITY OF CONTRACT" BETWEEN 
THE PURCHASER AND THE INSPECTOR AND THE PURCHASER'S ALLEGED 
LOSS IS FOR BREACH OF WARRANTIES AND NOT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES 
It is undisputed that the subject vehicle, a used "Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company" van, was purchased from a third-party in an 
"AS IS" condition. Prior to the consumation of that purchase, the 
Inspector had at the request of the third-party seller, but 
without any "privity of contract" with the Buyer performed the 
"safety inspection" upon the vehicle as required by the Utah 
Highway Patrol and Utah statute. 
The Court must keep in mind that the Buyer's claim here is 
NOT for injuries sustained as a result of an accident with that 
vehicle, which accident might have been caused by the unsafe 
condition of the vehicle. Rather, the Buyer's claim somewhat 
vaguely pleaded in a "small claims" action is for "negligent 
inspection". This claim, together with the evidence and argument 
adduced at trial, is perhaps refined into two causes of action: 
(A) a "breach of contract" theory; and/or (B) a "breach of 
warranty" theory. 
A 
The Buyer cannot recover under a "breach of contract" theory 
because there was NO CONTRACT between him and the Inspector. The 
safety inspection was performed at the request of the Seller. 
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There was no "privity". The Inspector sought to be held 
accountable for the alleged "breach" had no way of knowing that 
the Buyer was relying on the inspection for anything other than 
the statutory "safety inspection". The Inspector did not know 
that the Buyer was allegedly relying on the inspection for MORE 
THAN the limited safety issues; the Buyer was relying on the 
inspection as an UNLIMITED GUARANTEE that there were no 
mechanical defects in the vehicle whatsoever. 
It is patently unfair to assess liability, in an amount in 
excess of $400, when the Inspector's charge for his "inspection" 
is limited, by law, to a mere $10. 
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B 
The Buyer should not be able to recover under a "breach of 
warranty" theory either. There was simply no "warranty"^. 
There was no evidence that there was any "warranty" before 
the trial court. In Billings Yamaha vs Rick Warner Ford, 681 P.2d 
1276 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that a finding of 
breach of warranty cannot be sustained on appeal where there is 
no written copy of the warranty in the record and where there was 
no oral testimony at trial covering warranty's terms. That 
holding is directly on point in this case. The Inspector made no 
warrantyl There was no documentary evidence from the Buyer as 
to what the UHP regulations for "safety inspections" required or 
The only "warranty" which would be reasonably implied was that 
the vehicle met the UTAH "safety requirements" ON THE DATE IT WAS 
INSPECTED. Indeed, the Inspector so testified. To this, the Buyer 
presented no rebuttal evidence. 
The Buyer did testify that a Montana mechanic advised him 
(hearsay) to have the "alignment" repaired at a cost of $191.00. 
There was no non-hearsay evidence that the "alignment" parts 
were defective. 
[The Buyer didn't bring into court any of the allegedly 
defective parts.] Furthermore, there was no evidence that 
"alignment" is an item for which the Inspector was inspecting. 
The Inspector submits that under the Regulations issued by the 
Utah Highway Patrol, the "alignment" of the front wheels is not 
an item which is required to be inspected" and for which a 
"rejection" sticker may be issued! 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that by the time the 
Montana mechanic saw the vehicle's alignment, it had been driven 
over "five hundred miles" and that by the time the Buyer examined 
the brakes, the vehicle had been driven over 1000 miles. If the 
brakes stuck in the area of McCammon, Idaho (distance from Salt 
Lake City: approximately 150 miles), those brakes would have been 
stuck for 850 miles! It is no wonder that upon examination they 
were "burned"! 
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didn't require.2 The only real evidence was that the Inspector 
had performed the inspectionl The mere existense of the "safety 
inspection sticker" in the window of the used vehicle, purchased 
in an "AS IS" condition, should not be deemed to give rise to a 
warranty of the dimension framed by the trial court. 
The Buyer should not be able to recover from the Inspector 
under a "breach of warranty" theory when the Buyer was PRECLUDED 
BY LAW from recovering against the Seller of the vehicle. The 
inspection was performed, at the Seller's request, BEFORE THE 
SALES TRANSACTION! The vehicle was sold in an "AS IS" condition. 
The Buyer knew of that limitation and probably paid a lower 
purchase price because of it. The Buyer took possession of the 
vehicle with the mechanical defects, if any, inherent in the 
vehicle. 
Under Section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code [codified 
in Utah statutes at 70A-2-316], the Seller was insulated from the 
Buyer's claim. That statute provides in part: 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all 
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as 
is", "with all faults" or other language which in 
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and makes plain there is no 
implied warranty; and 
2 The sole evidence was: (1) that Mr Anderson of the UHP found 
insufficient evidence to conclude the Inspector improperly 
inspected the vehicle; (2) that the regulations required the 
emergency brake to be tested while in second or third gear, which 
test WAS performed by the Inspector; and (3) the Inspector's 
testimony concerning the thickness of the brake shoe linings on 
the date he inspected them. 
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(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract 
has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully 
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there 
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an 
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed 
to him; . . 
Emphasis added. 
The Buyer could have examined the vehicle for any defects. 
The "AS IS" condition, by law, alerted him to the possibility 
there may have been problems. The Buyer chose to ignore the 
statutory obligations placed upon himl He could have examined the 
brakes. [Bear in mind that it is his testimony alone as to the 
"defective" condition of the brakes. He personally changed the 
brake shoes upon the return from Montana. He had begun the repair 
with the intent of replacing a "seal", which, he felt, might 
have been damaged "during the inspection." While changing the 
shoes is relatively routine, changing a brake cylinder "seal" is 
relatively involved. The "seal", which is almost fully enclosed 
wi thin the brake cylinder, is fully protected: there is 
practically no way a "seal" could be damaged during a routine 
safety inspection which would entail only the removal of the 
wheels (tires and brake drums) and a quick examination of the 
thickness of brake shoe linings. In any event, if the Buyer is so 
competent to change the "shoes" and/or the "seals", why didn't he 
make a quick inspection BEFORE he purchased the vehicle? And 
after he determined they were so defective, why didn't he take a 
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picture of them, or have a friend examine them (so as to have a 
third-party verification of the defect), or, as a minimum, "save 
the old parts" as reapir shops are often requested to do?] 
In W. R. H., Inc. vs Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court, quoting the California 
Supreme Court, stated: 
A consumer should not be charged at the will of the 
manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury 
when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, 
be fairly charged with the risk that the product will 
not match his economic expectations unless the 
manufacturer agrees that it will. 
633 P.2d at 47. Emphasis added. Such is the case here: the 
"manufacturer" (Inspector) of the "product" (the inspection) 
should not be "charged with the risk" that the product will "meet 
the expectatins" of the Buyer unless the Inspector agrees that it 
wi 11. The Inspector made no such agreement! He merely performed 
the inspection, as required by law. 
Certainly if the law precludes recovery against the Seller 
of the vehicle for mechanical defects, certainly the law should 
preclude recovery against the Inspector, who, in relationship to 
the Buyer, stands "behind" the Seller. The Buyer should not be 
allowed to "jump" over the insulated Seller and receive recovery 
against the Inspector, whose fee was fixed by statute and who had 
no idea the Buyer was relying on the inspection for that expanded 
purpose. 
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This Court must consider the effect an affirmance of the 
trial court's judgment will have upon the "safety inspection" 
program. If the judgment stands and the Court of Appeals holds 
that an inspection station is thus financially responsible to the 
purchaser of that vehicle for mechanical defects, stations will 
be hesitant to perform the inspections particularly for the 
miniscule fee allowed by statute. This will have the effect of 
rendering it impossible to obtain a legitimate safety inspection, 
except and unless there is paid a "scalped" price not authorized 
by statute. [The financial liability for the inspector is simply 
too great for the meager profit, if any, he obtains.] Such a 
result can hardly be intended by the Legislature when the safety 
inspection program was adopted I 
II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE BUYER IN MISUSING THE VEHICLE 
The Buyer testified that the brakes of the vehicle locked up 
outside of McCammon, Idaho. The Buyer testified that he "backed 
up" to get them unlocked. He then drove to Montana and returned 
to the Salt Lake City area, where he examined the rear brakes and 
found the rear brake shoe linings to be "burned." 
The Inspector testified that when he examined the vehicle, 
the brake shoe linings were "six thirty-secondths" (6/32nds) and 
"four thirty-secondths" (4/32nds) of any inch thick. [The 
UHP "minimums" are 2/32nds of an inch.] 
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To drive the vehicle with "locked" rear brakes such a 
distance must certainly constitute "contributory negligence". 
[The Buyer testified that he, as a heavy equipment operator, 
would know that the brakes were locked because of the "feel". To 
this was be pointed out that he was driving a "brand new" (for 
him) vehicle, the "feel" of which he couldn't have developed in 
such a short time.] Under the terms of the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act, Section 78-27-37 et seq, Utah Code, the trial 
judge should have taken into account the "comparative negligence" 
of the Buyer and should have reduced or denied altogether 
the amount awarded to the Buyer. The trial judge did not do such; 
he awarded the full claim to the Buyer. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
intentional misuse of a vehicle is a defense to a claim for 
personal injuries incurred from an allegedly-defective product 
under a "strict liability" theory. Ernest W. Hahn vs Armco Steel 
Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). Such should also be the case when 
there are no claimed "personal injuries" and the Buyer's misuse 
of the product aggravated, if not totally induced, the defective 
condition (i.e. "burned" brakes). 
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Ill 
THE TRIAL JUDGE INCORRECTLY BASED HIS DECISION ON 
INCOMPETENT, HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
The Buyer testified that upon arrival in Montana, he felt 
the tires were "wearing" badly. He took the vehicle to a mechanic 
in Montana, who told him---hearsay that the "alignment" needed 
repair. With the Buyer's permission, the mechanic for a cost of 
$191.00 repaired the alignment of the vehicle. The Buyer sued 
for recovery of this and other costs. 
There was no evidence presented that "alignment" is an area 
for which the Inspector should have inspected. There was no 
evidence that the Inspector could have "rejected"^ the vehicle 
for this reason. On the contrary, the Inspector asserts that the 
Utah Highway Patrol regulations do not allow him to "reject" the 
vehicle for problems with the "alignment" which merely cause the 
tires to "wear" improperly. 
If the Buyer incorrectly assumed that such was "covered" 
under the Utah Highway Patrol "safety inspection", it should be 
he not the Inspector-—who should suffer economically from that 
mistaken assumption! 
The Buyer bases his entire case against the Inspector on the 
existence of the "safety inspection" sticker in the window. There 
was no showing that the Inspector should have "rejected" the 
vehicle and placed a "rejection" sticker in the window (or at 
least refused to place an "inspection" sticker in the 
window)---for problems with the "alignment". 
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IV 
THE FAILURE TO JOIN THE SELLER OF THE VEHICLE 
PRECLUDES JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSPECTOR 
This action was filed and prosecuted by the parties 
themselves as a "small claims" case. As untrained laymen, they 
were obviously unaware of the legal principles which are 
determinative of their respective rights. 
Notwithstanding the ignorance of the parties, the trial 
court is obligated to follow the law. Section 78-6-8, Utah Code, 
pertaining to "small claims court" cases, allows the proceedings 
to be "informal, with the sole object of dispensing speedy 
justice between the parties. . ." Nevertheless, the trial court 
should have taken into account the statutory prohibition against 
recovery (under Section 70A-2-316) discussed in Point I, above. 
The trial court should have also taken into account the 
provisions of Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides in part: 
A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jursidiction over 
the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party 
if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, . . . If he has 
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be 
made a party. . . 
Emphasis added. 
Although the Seller did appear at the trial and did testify 
on behalf of the Inspector, the Seller was not joined as 
party-litigant. The trial judge, even before he began the 
proceedings- — o r at least at some point prior to their 
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conclusion should have realized that there would be a 
"substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations". 
The trial judge should have realized that the Seller was an 
indispensible party to the action, if for no other reason that to 
provide "contribution", if any, based upon the relative fault, if 
any, of the Seller and Inspector, pursuant to Section 78-27-39 et 
seq, Utah Code, Certainly the Seller of the vehicle perhaps 
making several hundred dollars in profit from the sale of the 
arguably-defective vehicle should help participate in the 
payment of an adverse judgment to a much greater extent that the 
poor Inspector whose "profit", if any, in the transaction is 
limited to the statutory $10. 
CONCLUSION 
The Inspector cannot be held financially liable for the 
mechanical "fitness" of the vehicle, purchased from an 
intervening third-party in an "AS IS" condition. Such was not the 
purpose for which the vehicle was "inspected". There was no 
"privity of contract" or contact between the Buyer and Inspector; 
the Inspector had no way of knowing the Buyer was ostensibly 
relying on the "inspection" for that expanded purpose. 
The Buyer waived his rights to recover for mechanical 
defects in the vehicle by purchasing it in an "AS IS" condition. 
He waived his rights by not adequately examining the vehicle 
prior to the purchase thereof. 
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The Buyer's own "negligence" in driving the vehicle should 
have diminished if not precluded altogether recovery for the 
burned "brakes". 
There was no evidence that "alignment" and "improper tire 
wear" are the proper subject of a "safety inspection". 
The trial court improperly based its judgment on incompetent 
(there was no showing that the MONTANA mechanic had any 
particular expertise in evaluating whether the "alignment" was 
defective under UTAH "safety inspection" standards), hearsay 
evidence. 
The failure of the trial court to join as a party-litigant 
the Seller who sold the vehicle precludes recovery against the 
Inspector. 
Wherefore, the judgment entered by the trial court must be 
set aside, judgment should be entered in favor of the 
Defendant-Appellant and costs be awarded to the 
Defendant-Appellant (Inspector) for prosecuting this appeal. In 
the alternative, the case should be remanded to the trial court 
for joinder of the Seller. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of July, 1987. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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